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EFFICACY OF COLLATERAL TYPES USED BY FINANCIAL 
INTERMEDIARIES IN KWAZULU-NATAL 
 




Collateral is an important incentive device used by lenders to encourage loan repayment. 
However, collateral must have secure and transferable title, it must be marketable, have low 
lender liquidation costs and lenders must be able to attach the collateral. Study results for 
rural and micro-enterprise finance institutions in KwaZulu-Natal showed that assets such as 
vehicles and equipment were not effective as collateral due to high costs in attaching the 
asset. Cessions on crops were often constrained by flaws in collection mechanisms. Secure 
and transferable property rights were important preconditions for land to have value as 
collateral. Collateral substitutes such as joint liability mechanisms were less effective when 
lending to large farmer groups (30-60 members) compared with small groups (4-6 
individuals) of micro-entrepreneurs operating in urban areas. 
 
DIE DOELMATIGHEID VAN TIPES KOLLATERAAL GEBRUIK DEUR 
FINANSIËLE TUSSENGANGERS IN KWAZULU-NATAL 
 
Kollateraal is 'n belangrike insentiefinstrument wat deur krediteure gebruik word om 
terugbetaling van lenings aan te moedig.  Kollateraal moet egter 'n veilige en oordraagbare 
eiendomsware hê, dit moet bemarkbaar wees, lae likwidasiekoste vir die krediteur hê en 
krediteure moet in staat wees om op kollateraal beslag te lê.  Studieresultate vir landelike en 
mikro-onderneming finansiële instellings in KwaZulu-Natal het getoon dat bates soos 
voertuie en gereedskap weens die hoë koste aan inbeslagneming van die bate, nie effektiewe 
kollateraal was nie. Sessies op oeste is dikwels beperk deur swakhede in insamelings-
meganismes.  Veilige en oordraagbare besitreg is belangrike voorvereistes vir grond om 
waarde as kollateraal te hê.  Kollaterale substitute soos gesamentlike aanspreklikheids-
meganismes was minder suksesvol waar daar aan groter boeregroepe (30-60 lede) geleen is as 




Agency relationships arise in loan contracts due to the intertemporal nature of 
the contract where the lender contracts with the borrower to productively 
utilise and repay the lender’s funds at a future point in time (Barry et al., 
1995). The lender may, however, not be able to accurately monitor the 
borrower's actions and hence cannot condition the contracts on these actions. 
It may also be difficult for the lender to separate the effects of random states 
of nature (adverse weather, theft, fire), about which the borrower has some, 
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possibly incomplete information, from borrower's actions. The lender thus has 
difficulty in verifying whether the inability of the borrower to repay the loan 
results from the borrower's actions or unfavourable exogenous events. This 
leads to an agency problem, since the borrower has an incentive to take 
actions that maximise his own utility to the detriment of the lender (moral 
hazard) (Arrow, 1985). 
 
The lender must thus design loan contracts to provide an incentive for the 
borrower to take appropriate actions and repay the loan, given that the loan 
contract must offer the borrower utility at least equal to what he could receive 
in other activities (participation constraint) (Hayami & Otsuka, 1993). An 
important incentive device used by lenders to encourage loan repayment is 
collateral. However, the use of collateral involves costs for both borrower and 
lender, and thus more collateral does not always result in better access to 
credit. The institutional environment also has an important influence on the 
value and acceptability of certain assets as collateral (Nagarajan & Meyer, 
1995). This paper aims to assess the efficacy of collateral and collateral 
substitutes used by lenders who financed micro-enterprise and rural clients in 
KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) during 1996. Understanding of the limitations and 
costs which lenders incur in using collateral may facilitate local institutional 
reform to improve markets for collateral, and assist loan enforcement. This 
would complement efforts by the Strauss Commission to improve access of 
rural people to financial services in South Africa. Section two reviews factors 
affecting the efficacy of collateral, while sections three and four present 
research methodology and results. A concluding section considers the policy 
implications of the results. 
 
2.  CHARACTERISTICS OF COLLATERAL 
 
Collateral is “an asset that upon liquidation is adequate to cover all or most of 
the lender's risk exposure including principal, accrued interest and collection 
costs” (Nagarajan & Meyer, 1995:3). In addition, collateral should be 
characterised by appropriability, absence of collateral specific risks and allow 
the borrower to accrue returns by directly using the collateral or deriving 
returns from the investment with loans obtained using the collateral 
(Binswanger & Rosenzweig, 1986). Collateral generally includes physical 
assets such as land and chattel mortgages (equipment and machinery). 
Collateral can function as both an enforcement and a signalling device. As an 
enforcement device, collateral secures loans against exogenous risks (poor 
business performance due to events uncontrollable by the borrower) by 
allowing the lender to liquidate the collateral in the event of loan default, 




threats of foreclosure discourage the borrower from engaging in moral 
hazardous activities (Bester, 1985). High risk borrowers will, therefore, be 
required to offer more collateral than low risk borrowers while the loan 
amount is expected to increase and the interest rate to decrease as the value of 
the collateral increases and lender transaction costs in using the collateral 
decrease (Barro, 1976). 
 
As a signalling device lenders can use collateral to distinguish between high 
and low risk borrowers by offering a menu of contracts with different 
collateral and interest rate requirements. If preferences of borrowers depend 
systematically on their type, then lower risk borrowers exhibit a higher 
marginal rate of substitution between interest payments and collateral. Thus 
lower risk borrowers will be inclined to accept a loan contract with higher 
collateral and lower interest rate requirements since their probability of 
project failure is lower than for high risk borrowers (Bester, 1985; Besanko & 
Thakor, 1987; Chan & Kanatas, 1985). Lenders can thus use the signalling 
value of collateral as a low cost self-selection and incentive mechanism to sort 
borrowers according to their  risk types. Hence, provided borrower wealth is 
sufficient and collateralisation costs are low, no credit rationing will exist in 
credit markets (Bester, 1985). 
 
For collateral to serve as a useful enforcement device, the collateral must be 
able to reduce the lender’s default loss or make it costly for the borrower to 
default. This requires that the asset has well established and transferable 
property rights, and a legal environment that facilitates loan contract 
enforcement such that the lender is able to foreclose and attach the asset. In 
addition, liquidation costs must be sufficiently low and asset marketability 
good to enable the lender to recover sufficient funds from liquidating the 
collateral to cover loan losses (Barro, 1976; Nagarajan & Meyer, 1995). The 
asset should also not be easily prone to loss of value due to collateral specific 
risks like theft, pretended theft, damag e  b y  f i r e  o r  a c c i d e n t  a n d  p o o r  
maintenance (Binswanger & Rosenzweig, 1986). For collateral to serve as an 
effective signalling device borrower wealth and collateralisation costs are 
important. Borrower collateralisation costs include potential loss of collateral 
if the investment fails, costs incurred by the borrower in pledging collateral 
(group formation, legal costs) and foregone opportunities to use collateral to 
secure additional debt (Chan & Kanatas, 1985; Feder et al., 1988).  
 
The ability of collateral to serve as a signalling device may be undermined if 
the marginal collateralisation costs of low risk borrowers are higher than for 
high risk borrowers, and if low risk borrowers have less wealth to offer as 




Chan & Kanatas, 1985). In addition, the asset holdings should be positively 
related to ability to repay so that low risk borrowers can distinguish 
themselves from high risk borrowers. The possibility of debt re-negotiation 
further undermines the ability of collateral to serve as a signalling device since 
high risk borrowers then have an incentive to pledge more collateral   
(Nagarajan & Meyer, 1995). The State has an important role to play in 
financial markets by facilitating contract law enforcement and institution 
building. The development of market institutions that improve tenure 
security and that facilitate the transfer of these property rights are important 
for assets such as land to have value as collateral. A credible and effective 
legal framework which enforces loan contracts is also necessary to provide a 
real threat to borrowers of possible foreclosure in the event of loan default 
(Fafchamps et al., 1994). Thus costs of default to the borrower are increased, 
reducing the possibility of moral hazard and voluntary default (Bester, 1985). 
Hence, lender transaction costs and institutional constraints (absence of 
market for land, and poor contract enforcement mechanisms) may reduce the 
value of assets as collateral to the lender, while borrower collateralisation 
costs and limited wealth may reduce the ability of borrowers to pledge 
collateral (Barro, 1976; Bester, 1985). Financial intermediaries involved in rural 
and micro-business finance often face high transaction costs in liquidating 
collateral due to the often poor condition of the assets, institutional constraints 
(title to land often not secure and transferable), geographic dispersion of 
borrowers, poor rural infrastructure, low wealth borrowers unable to pledge 
suitable collateral, and a costly and/or ineffective legal system (Nagarajan & 
Meyer, 1995). 
 
Given the limited value of land and chattel assets as collateral, as well as poor 
legal structures to enforce contracts, lenders have resorted to collateral 
substitutes. These are non-physical assets with or without market value, or 
physical assets that have qualities other than collateral to enforce loan 
repayment (Nagarajan & Meyer, 1995). Examples include interlinked 
contracts (crop processor - farmer), joint liability groups, savings and 
guarantee funds. While these collateral substitutes may alleviate the problem 
of suitable collateral, they are also subject to borrower collateralisation and 
lender transaction costs, reducing their efficacy. Group loans provide 
collateral through joint liability where the individuals engage in implicit 
screening and monitoring on behalf of the lender. This potentially effective 
collateral form requires considerable investments in group formation, 
frequent repayment schedules (weekly, bi-weekly, monthly) to generate 
meetings for interaction and discipline required to maintain group cohesion, 
and the spatial dispersion of the borrowers must be such that peer monitoring 




necessarily high for both borrower and lender. Spatial dispersion of 
borrowers as encountered in group loans to large farmer groups may further 
increase monitoring costs for borrowers to the point where the joint liability 
mechanism is no longer effective. The frequency of the loan repayment 
schedules also may not fit seasonal cash flow patterns of farmers, reducing 
regular contact between borrower and lender, while high covariant risks of 
agricultural production further undermine the joint liability mechanism - thus 
group loans to farmers have been less successful (Graham, 1995). Group 
lending has been observed to work best with micro-enterprises (e.g. spasa 
shops, sewing clubs) operating in urban areas where groups are small (4 - 6 
individuals per group) such that the monitoring costs are lower and the cash 
flow supports regular repayment schedules. 
 
Third party guarantors, although potentially effective, may pose additional 
costs to the lender since their credit worthiness also has to be assessed. 
Reputational capital is created by the threat of no future loans should 
borrowers default on existing loans and use of credit listing agencies. The 
borrower’s reputation depends on his past loan repayment performance and 
the reputation thus formed affects future economic opportunities. However, 
for reputational capital to acquire value and work effectively as collateral, 
information about borrower default must be communicated effectively 
between lenders, while the borrower must also derive sufficient utility from 
access to future loans in order not to default (Hayami & Otsuka, 1993). Thus 
collateral use may differ for lenders operating in different markets subject to 
borrower transaction costs, liquidation costs, collateral specific risks and 
institutional arrangements. 
 
3. RESEARCH  METHODOLOGY 
 
Six KZN institutions (A1 to A6), who for confidentiality purposes cannot be 
named, were surveyed at regional and head office level in 1996 to document 
collateral characteristics. Data were collected on micro-enterprise and rural 
client loan contract mechanisms, with specific emphasis on different collateral 
types and other penalty and incentive schemes used by lenders. Lenders A1, 
A2 and A3 made primarily agricultural and community services loans, while 
lenders A4 and A5 financed micro-entrepreneurs in urban areas. Lender A6 
focused on personal consumption loans to persons earning a fixed salary. 
 
4. SURVEY  RESULTS 




Table 1 presents an evaluation of the efficacy (low, medium or high) of 
collateral types used by the six lenders. Cessions on crops used by A2 and A3 





Table 1  Collateral Types and Attributes 
 
Collateral Types  Lender  Borrower Costs  Lender Costs  Efficacy 





















Crop Cessions  A2  L*  L - M  -  M - H  M - H  L - M  L - M 
  A3  L  L - M  -  M - H  M - H  L - M  L - M 
Machinery, Vehicles, 
Equipment 
A2  L  L - M  M - H  M - H  H  M - H  L 
Permission to Occupy 
(communal land) 
A2  L - M  L  -  -  -  ZERO  L 
Mortgage bonds on 
Private Land 
A2  L - M  H  L - M  -  L  H  H 
Joint Liability Groups  A1 (farmer)  M - H  -  -  M - H  -  -  L 
  A2 (farmer)  M - H  -  -  M - H  -  -  L - M 
 A5  micro-
enterprise) 
L - M  -  -  L - M  -  -  H 
Third Party 
Guarantors 
A4  L - M  H  L  L  L - M  -  H 
Reputational 
Collateral 
A6  L  H  -  -  -  -  M - H 
  A5  L  H  -  -  -  -  M - H 
  A4  L  H  -  -  -  -  M - H 
  A2  L  L - M  -  -  -  -  L - M 
  A3  L  L - M  -  -  -  -  L - M 








processors where loan payments were automatically deducted on crop 
delivery, thereby increasing security of title to the lender. High collateral 
specific risks, resulting from exogenous shocks such as adverse weather and 
fire, and flaws in loan collection systems (for example some borrowers 
delivered on quotas of growers who had no loans and thus avoided 
deduction) reduced crop transferability to the lender. Thus potential loss of 
payment to the borrower was minimal increasing the incentive to default. 
Legal action was seldom considered due to the high costs and length of legal 
processes. This led to intensive borrower monitoring which increased lender 
transaction costs and lowered the efficacy of cessions as collateral.  
 
Machinery, vehicles and equipment, used by A2, had high collateral specific 
risks because of 1) the possibility of theft, 2) borrowers could easily dispose of 
the machinery without the lender's knowledge, and 3) poor maintenance often 
resulted in rapid devaluation of the asset. High collateral specific risks and 
geographic dispersion made it difficult and costly for the lender to locate the 
borrowers, increasing lender liquidation costs, while poor condition and low 
value of the asset reduced marketability. Borrower collateralisation costs were 
low since costs involved in pledging the collateral were minimal. In addition, 
a lengthy and expensive legal procedure to attach the asset reduced the 
probability of loss of collateral to the borrower (legal action was unlikely). 
This, together with high collateral specific risks and liquidation costs, reduced 
the efficacy of machinery and equipment as collateral.  
 
Lender A2 accepted permission to occupy certificates (PTO's) in certain 
instances when financing fixed property investments in communal areas of 
KwaZulu-Natal. Since the occupant of the property has only usufruct rights to 
the land, tenure is insecure, limiting the transferability of the land to the 
lender. This collateral type thus has no value since the lender cannot take 
possession on the land in the event of default. Lender A2 is able to use 
mortgage bonds on private land purchased outside communal areas. Lender 
liquidation costs are low to moderate since use of costly and lengthy legal 
procedures is still required. Collateral specific risks are low as land cannot 
easily lose value. Land title is secure, transferable and markets for land exist, 
giving land value and ready transferability to the lender. 
 
Joint liability mechanisms were used by lenders A1, A2, and A5. Lenders A1 
and A2 extended group loans to farmer associations for irrigation, food 
garden and seasonal crop establishment. Lender A5 extended loans to micro-
entrepreneurs operating in urban areas. For A1 and A2 the group members 
were responsible for group formation with some guidance given by the 




transaction costs. In addition, these groups were large (30 - 60 members) and 
members were spatially dispersed, increasing monitoring costs between 
individuals, while group heterogeneity (consisted of men and women who 
did not know one another well) further undermined the joint liability 
mechanism. Both A1 and A2 negotiated loan terms with the group leaders 
who were then responsible for loan collection from the individual members, 
further reducing lender transaction costs. Loan repayment was seasonal 
resulting in less frequent contact between borrowers and lender, as is 
normally prevalent in group loan schemes. This enables the lender to monitor 
the groups and instil financial discipline amongst group members . Thus 
while potentially reducing lender transaction costs, borrower group formation 
and monitoring costs undermined the joint liability mechanism, making this 
form of collateral less useful when financing farmer groups. 
 
Lender A5 financed small (4-6 members) homogenous groups (members 
knew each other well, were all women and were involved in similar business 
ventures) of micro-entrepreneurs (spasa shops, sewing clubs etc.) operating in 
urban areas. While the group was responsible for organising itself, borrower 
transaction costs were relatively lower since the groups were small and 
members knew each other well. The lender also invested considerable 
amounts of time in establishing the groups, while the income patterns of 
business ventures of members suited frequent (monthly) loan repayment 
schedules. This allowed the lender to effectively monitor group performance, 
increasing lender transaction costs. These groups were observed to be more 
successful than the larger farmer groups. 
 
Third party guarantors were only used by A4. New borrowers were 
introduced to the scheme through existing borrowers who, in many instances, 
became the guarantors, thus lowering borrower collateralisation costs. Lender 
costs were also minimal since the guarantor was well known to the lender and 
reliable. This form of collateral worked effectively since both the guarantor 
and the new borrower would not be allowed to take out any new loans upon 
loan default. Reputational capital (policies of not granting new loans to 
borrowers who defaulted on existing loans and use of credit agencies) was 
used by all lenders but was effective only where strictly enforced by lenders. 
Lenders A4, A5 and A6 strictly applied the policy of no future loans while 
lenders A2 and A3 were more lenient, thus reducing the efficacy of 
reputational capital. Credit agencies were used as a means of spreading this 
information  between lenders. These agencies can be an effective means of 
building reputational capital since they provide information to major 
furniture and clothing stores. However, credit agencies removed borrowers’ 




effectively removing historical information important in building reputational 
capital. This further undermined the use of reputational capital as collateral. 
Lenders also noted that borrower prosecution in the event of loan default was 
unlikely because of the costly and lengthy legal procedures. Hence the low 
possibility of foreclosure lowered the efficacy of especially the formal asset 




It is important that assets used as collateral are characterised by ease of 
liquidation, low collateral specific risks and transferability. Lenders in the 
study sample have made use of a variety of collateral types to try and 
facilitate loan repayment. However, high collateral specific risks, high 
liquidation costs and poor asset appropriability reduced the effectiveness of 
crop cessions, machinery and equipment as well as property in communal 
areas of KZN as collateral types. This limits the ability of the lender to recover 
the full cost of a loan. In addition, a costly and ineffective legal system reduces 
the value of collateral as an incentive device, lowering the cost of default to 
the borrower thus not discouraging moral hazardous activities. Increased, 
although costly, monitoring may reduce collateral specific risks associated 
with chattel and cession collateral. While high collateral specific risks 
associated with vehicle and equipment finance are reduced through 
compulsory insurance with lenders, monitoring is still necessary to reduce 
risks of voluntary theft. Institutional reform, to promote secure and tradable 
property rights in rural areas is an important prerequisite in improving the 
collateral value of land, allowing individuals better access to institutional 
credit (provided that lenders can foreclose on land in the event of default). 
This is evidenced by PTO's which had no use as collateral since the property 
rights to which they pertain are insecure and not tradable. It is essential that 
contract law is backed by an accessible and effective legal system capable of 
providing a credible threat to individuals thus increasing the cost of default. 
This may further deter borrowers from misusing crop cession mechanisms 
and chattel assets. It may also assist in influencing the perceptions of the 
legitimacy of contractual agreements contributing to developing a culture of 
payment of loaned money. 
 
Joint liability mechanisms require stringent conditions for success and may be 
less effective in providing access to credit for farmer groups in rural KZN. 
These groups were large and members spatially dispersed (such that 
individuals did not benefit from monitoring each other), not well constituted 
(limited investment in group formation), and heterogeneous, which often led 




was seasonal and hence frequent contact between lender and borrowers was 
not maintained to instil borrower discipline and group cohesion. Constituting 
and maintaining farmer groups may also impose high costs on both borrower 
and lender, owing to substantial investments in group formation, and may 
therefore be a less desirable form of collateral for financing emerging farmer 
groups. Group loans were more successful in urban areas, where the groups 
were small (4 - 6 members), homogenous and members were able to make 
regular monthly repayments which brought them into contact with the lender 
could then monitor group performance closely. Reputational capital could 
also become an important collateral type, provided that lenders strictly 
enforce the policy of not giving borrowers access to future funds if they have 
defaulted on previous loans. This information can also be effectively 
communicated through credit listing agencies. However, stricter policies on 
name removal need to be adopted to increase the potency of reputational 
capital as a form of collateral. Rural finance institutions in KZN need to be 
able to provide borrowers with sufficient incentives to repay their loans and, 
together with the legal system, provide a credible threat of contract 
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